Notes from Limmud 2007: Saudi Arabia: Kingdom on the Rebound
Thursday, February 7th, 2008 12:17 pm![[personal profile]](https://www.dreamwidth.org/img/silk/identity/user.png){kind=small}
lethargic_manNotes from Limmud 2007
Saudi Arabia: Kingdom on the Rebound
Adam Goodvach
[Standard disclaimer: All views not in square brackets are those of the speaker, not myself. Accuracy of transcription is not guaranteed (not least because this speaker went very fast).]
The historical regions of the Arabian Peninsula are the Ḥijaz in the west: Mecca and Medina. Najd is the central area, where the House of Saud came from. (In the southwest is Yemen, the south Hadramawt and Oman the southeast.)
In 2005 there were lots of issues, but they seem to have been resolved. There was a succession issue, but Abdullah has become king and established stability. Funding the massive royal family—tens of thousands of princes—had annoyed the middle-class, but the rise in oil prices solved that. There had been calls for reform across the judiciary, education and politics; the reformists have, however, been ignored as prosperity brought spending, though some reforms have occurred. In 2005 Al-Qaeda were targeting the Saudi state rather than foreigners. (There are no moderates in Saudi Arabia, but al-Qaeda are the extremist extremists.) This sparked a push-back that has all but defeated al-Qaeda in Saudi Arabia. US bases were also a major source of resentment; these bases have now been closed down.
Historical Background
In the mid-18th century, Moḥammed ibn Saud was the sheikh of a tribe in central Arabia. He joined with the Wahhabist sect in 1744; Wahhab promoted a "pristine" form of Islam. Wahhabism and the Saudis have grown together. Saudi Arabia is not a religious theocracy, though: there is a division between the clerics and the monarchy. Ibn Saud took the Peninsula and made Riyadh the capital. When his people took over Mecca, they sacked Moḥammed's tomb as they feared people would be worshiping it.
The Saudis were pushed out of Mecca by Moḥammed Ali in the mid-1800s. Civil wars followed, and the Sauds became weaker and weaker. Their age-old enemy, the Rashids, pushed the Sauds out of Arabia altogether, to Kuwait.
Abdul Aziz ibn Saud returned in 1902, and over the next twenty-three years conquered the land from the Ottomans, established the modern Saudi Arabia, and became one of the richest people in the world. The Hashemite Sherif of Mecca—part of the Qureish tribe—also stirred against the Ottomans.
In WW1, Britain fostered an anti-Ottoman uprising. The British provided weapons and money to the Sauds and Rashid and the Sherif. Whichever attacked the other first would lose British support. The British supported the Sherif most, but he lost, in the end. They'd promised to create him an Arab kingdom within the Ottoman Empire, but they went back on that at the Treaty of Versailles. The Sherif refused to sign; the British pulled their support for him; and in a short amount of time the Sauds attacked and easily defeated him. They then sent a letter to all major Islamic communities saying "Don't worry, we're not going to sack the Tomb of Moḥammed this time!"—this shows how much the sacking had worried the Islamic world.
Abdul Aziz (1880–1953) established a close relationship with the USA. The amount of change that went on during his lifetime was huge—oil has completely transformed the country.
All the kings since have been his children. (Recall that Islam allows up to four wives, in a rolling fashion.) Saud ibn Abdul Aziz was briefly king ('53-'64). He was forced to resign due to alcoholism and fiscal mismanagement. (There was more money than they knew what to do with, but he bankrupted the country anyway.)
Faisal ibn Abdul Aziz inherited the bankrupcy. He took control of Aramco (the Saudi/US petrol company, previously 100% US-owned) and turned around finances. He pressured Israel and the west during the 1973/4 oil crisis.
The following king was Fahd (1982-2005), who spent much of his reign hospitalised post-stroke. Abdullah, who was running the place after Fahd's stroke, is now king.The Sauds controlled a country the world didn't care about—until in the late 30s oil was discovered. Petrodollars flowed in the 1950s and 60s, and extensive modernisation took place. Money was used to buy allegiances—especially clerics. Their money and being Islamic fundamentalists allowed them to export this globally, e.g. to Pakistan, whose madrassas are funded by Saudi Arabia.
Money changed the country: the number of educated rose; including women. The situation of women still leaves a lot to be desired; but it's a lot better than it was. The country's nomadic population also became sedentary.
This began 70 years of pro-West policy. The US got mining rights for the oil, and the right to a military base since WW2. This relationship was strained during the 70s oil embargo, but renewed after the first Gulf War—they allowed 100,000s of US trooops in the "Land of the Two Holy Cities." All left in 2004/5 to Doha, due to relentless popular pressure.
This was a problem because Osama Bin Laden said, "Don't accept US troops; accept mine: We just kicked the Soviets out of Afghanistan; we'll protect you from Saddam." But the Saudis weren't enthralled with the prospect, and turned instead to the US. This led to a split between the pragmatic extremists and fundamentalist extremists: there had not, since the time of Moḥammed, been non-Muslims on the Arabian peninsula.
Pressures of Today—and how they're being survived
King Abdullah beat rivals to the kingship in 2005. He was in a weak position, though. His mother was from the Rashid tribe. This was a clever point of Abdul Aziz. He used clemency and revenge tactically—he married a Rashid. However, this didn't please Abdullah's brothers. He doesn't have any full brothers, so lacks strong allies amongst Abdul Aziz's main sons. He promised social reform, human rights and local elections, at a time when the royal family were weak.
Abdullah has distanced himself from the royal family. He holidays in a desert tent, and not the French Riviera being a playboy. He's a recognised Islamic scholar, unlike the rest of the family. He's popular with the population, because he takes his holidays in a tent.
There is, however, a succession issue. Abdullah is 83 years old. Crown Prince Sultan, his half-brother, is 84. Three older brothers who are even older have stepped aside from consideration. They created a Bay'ah (Allegiance) Council in October 2006. It was made up of the sons and senior grandsons of Abdul Aziz. Its purpose was to ensure the smooth transition of power in future. The next generation (the grandsons of Abdul Aziz) were given right to succession by King Fahd (1992) so they may be next in line. Gorbachev. Revolution. [Not entirely sure what this meant.]
The factors affecting the choice are: support within the Al Saud, Experience in government, tribal affiliations and the origins of the candidate's mother, Religious persona—a successful candidate must be acceptable to the clerics, support by the business community, and popularity amongst the general citizenry.
Oil
Oil "oils" the world economy. Saudi Arabia has over 80 oil fields and 1000+ working wells. It produces 10m barrels a day; the US consumes 20m a day. However, half Saudi Arabia's reserves are in only 8 fields.
Saudi Arabia has 25% of the world's oil deposits. USA gets 18% of its oil from Saudi Arabia—down from 28% in the early 90s. Saudi Arabia has the world's only daily surplus (2m) of oil, making the market liquid. Loss of Saudi production would triple the price of oil.
Trade with the US grew from $56.2m in 1950 to $19.3bn in 2000. The average annual growth rate is nearly 70%. Saudi Arabic holds $1tn in US banks and $1 in shares. [Looks like I've lost a multiplier here. :o)] This gives it great leverage—if they pulled it out, the US would collapse. This is why the USAns didn't go after the Saudis stronger after 9/11.
Saudi oil production is, however, vulnerable. There is a single site for oil production—separating gas and water from oil—Abqaiq. The volumes make it impractical to do it at the source, the well-head, like in the USA.
In Feb '06 a lorry-bomb attack was foiled. The effect would be 6-7m barrels per day off global production (83m) for 2–3 years. There is currently no excess capacity in the world.
Oil in the 1980s was far too cheap. There are three scenarios for oil prices in the future; we're already up in the high oil price scenario.
Terrorism
Saudi Arabia is a source of terrorism. 15 of the 19 9/11 hijackers were Saudi, as is Osama Bin Laden. In Iraq Saudi are 61% of Islamists killed and 70% of the suicide bombers. 74 Saudis are imprisoned in Jordan; and in Guantánamo Bay, Saudis outnumber all but Afghans.
Osama Bin Laden was an Arab hero in the country for a long time, for fighting the Soviets in Afghanistan; but also because he's landed a couple of blows against the US. The '91 Gulf War changed this, though: Bin Laden began vitriolic attacks on the Saudi royal family because of its cooperation with the US, and demanded the expulsion of foreign trooops.
His citizenship was revoked in 1994. '94-'95 saw Bin Laden launch a PR and terror campagin against foreigners. Saudis initiated several assassination attempts on him in the late '90s. (This is possibly why he has kidney problems—insufficient poison.)
Saudis showed little concern about attacks on foreigners in the '90s. The government blamed violence on gangs fighting over alcohol smuggling, not al-Qaeda. They arrested westerners, but of course it made no difference. Even 9/11 made little difference Now, they have promised to target radical imams promoting hatred of the US, but that didn't [make any] impact.
Historically, the Saudis bought off the Ulema [clergy] by supporting fundamentalism internationally (Pakistan and Indonesia).
Popular Saudi belief is that oil has corrupted the royal family. The family has got richer whilst people and Islam have been humiliated globally—in Kosovo, Chechnya, Palestine and Iraq, and by secular leaders. US troops and air bases were required to protected Muslims from each other.
Islamists rejected state use of Islam for legitimacy (1990s). They disapprove of the friendship with the US, which promotes anti-Islamic concepts. Materialistic lifestyles of Royal family and their supportive ulama [lacuna]. They have gained support among [lacuna]
Things changed in 2003/4 when al-Qaeda mounted a series of terrorist attacks that threatened state security. Assassination attempts against security officials caused some of the royals to fear for their own lives. In May '04 terrorists struck two oil installations and a foreigners' housing compound in Khobar, separating the Muslims from the non-Muslims, taking 50 hostages and killing 22 of them.
[?This] last great success turned the previously supportive population against al-Qaeda. They were killing 10 Saudis, Arabs and Muslims for every one foreigner; this was felt to be unjustified. Society became source of intelligence—families informing on each other. Saudi cooperation increased with FBI on extremist charges, mosques and terror cells—particularly fighters returning from Iraq. The message of senior clerics began to criticise al-Qaeda's theory and those Saudis who were gullible enough to follow them. 130 civilians and security service members were killed since '03 but only 12 in the last two years.
June '06, King Abdullah declared al-Qaeda defeated in Saudi Arabic. 150 Saudi and foreign personnel dead [context lost, sorry]. Another 120+ confirmed al-Qaeda operatives dead. Thousands of arrests, with several hundred still being held. Was it [lacuna]
In April '07, security forces arrested almost 200 suspected members of al-Qaeda in 7 simultaneous [raids]. They captured weapons and over $5 in cash and comms gear. [I'd guess the missing multiplier here is "million".] Documents revealed plans to attack the kingdom's oil infrastructure and military bases using hiacked aeroplanes. The arrested were mostly twenty-year-olds recruited online—not trained in al-Qaeda camps!
Only the security forces have been fighting terror; the ministeries of Education and Islamic Law still need to be turned around. Radicals still control the legal system and the ministeries of Education, Information, Interior and Justice; but the Government has pushed back against extremist elements.
Education of the young is the main issue. Royal advisers have reviewed the state curriculum and concluded it focuses on demonising the west and the religious "other"—Shia, Sufi, and African/Asian Islam.
Terror funding still emanates from Saudi Arabia, but now through back-door channels where it can't be detected, e.g. cash, charities, and the Islamic banking system.
Economics
- 80% of the country's revenue is from oil.
- There are 30,000 members of the Saud family today (and there will be 60,000 in 20 years)
- Saudi Arabia leads the world in per capita spending on defence, not including "off-budget" spending.
- The welfare state is expensive: there is free education, power, health, telephone, air travel.
- Population growth is the highest outside of Africa.
- Half the population is under 20, 97% below 64.
- Unemployment is between 9–20%
- Quarter of the population and one third of the workforce are foreign.
- 60% of all jobs filled by foreigners, and 80% of private-sector jobs.
Education is in the hands of clerics but is facing reform. 2/3 of all Ph.D.s are in Islamic studies; this results in importation of skills and creates recruits for extremism. Steps are being taken to address this: the Ministry has cut much offensive material from the curriculum; there is a massive USAn-modeled retraining scheme [lacuna], and private resources [lacuna].
The pace of change is governed by the price of oil. The last four years have nearly doubled the Saudi GDP to $350bn. Last years' £100bn current-account surplus boosted government's foreign assets to a record $250bn. Lack of US prestige in the Middle East has allowed the reform agenda to be dropped. Other acts contrary to US policy include Ḥamas/Fataḥ mediation. There is also the need to respond to the rise of Iran.
King Abdullah talked about reform when he first came to power (2006): "We cannot stand still while the world around us changes."
Public discontent is greatest in relation to the abuse of power by the religious military or mutawiyin. In July 07 they were charged with arbitrarily killing people taken into custody for moral offences: possession of alcohol, unchaperoned meeting, and immodest dress.
Major issues and institutions have not been tackled directly. Extreme traditionalists remain in [lacuna]. The Qur'an is the Saudi constitution but Sharia law is minimalist. A body of 700 Wahhabi scholars—chosen by each other—[lacuna].
Sweeping changes were announced in Oct to the judiciary, to build a modern system as required by the economic situation. There were Elections in 2005 for 1/5 of town councils, that were the first public polls in 42 years—though the councils themselves are powerless.
Ordinary Saudis are pushing the bounds of what's permissible, [?e.g.] Women's issues. Access to modern international (even Arab) media opens minds. Saudis see wisdom in the government's slow, consensual approach. The monarchy is consensual—it can hardly be otherwise, with 7000 princes!
The future
Islamists will continue to be kept under control—pending the return of fighters in Iraq. Iraq is giving confidence to the 1 million oppressed Saudi Shia (out of 21m).
Economics of oil will keep the kingdom strong, unless a massive world slowdown dampens demand. Training and job creation are key for the young population (cf. Dubai). This is for economic growth that brings jobs and post-oil wealth.
Reform will progress slowly, in the right direction. Women, and the judiciary, are the key.
Unless Abdullah is replaced by a stark conservative, the clerics' power will slip away as a move to a more modern society progresses. Education and foreign influence will be required.
Saudi Arabia and Iran
Iran and Saudi Arabi, as Shia vs. Sunni, have been regional rivals since the Iranian Revolution. Khatami's Presidency of Iran ('97–'05) took Iran back from its regional role: Iran became more defensive and looked outside the Middle East for the anti-US balance. Aḥmadinejad gained initiative in the Middle East with support for Ḥamas and Ḥezbollah. Saudi Arabia responded with a peace conference for Palestinian parties and internal Lebanese parties. Iran's nuclear program ramped up this competition.
Suddenly, however, in the last few months this has changed: Iran attended the Gulf Cooperation Council, and Abdullah invited Aḥmadinejad to the Ḥajj.
There are many reasons for this, including [?Saudi Arabia's] desires to distance itself from the Iran/US nuclear struggle, and lack of faith in US support.
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no subject
Date: 2008-02-07 12:42 pm (UTC)Given that this comes from you, I was kind of expecting a little more about the basis of the Wahabbin but I guess I'll just have to my usually thing of "think orthodox Sunni and turn it up to 11".
Another truly fascinating read. My respect for your Limmud attendance continues to grow.
no subject
Date: 2008-02-07 02:07 pm (UTC)You can say whatever you want. I was just amused that I happened to have a set of notes waiting to be made blog-ready that addressed your concern. :o)
Then again, that was excellent if a little too upbeat (personally, I expect Abdullah to be replaced by Captain Nightmare Scenario).
Well, the speaker said when he'd previously talked about Saudi Arabia it was all doom and gloom, but he'd overhauled his talk in the light of recent developments; hence the title.
Given that this comes from you, I was kind of expecting a little more about the basis of the Wahabbin but I guess I'll just have to my usually thing of "think orthodox Sunni and turn it up to 11".
Didn't go to any talks of that nature at Limmud, and, tbh, am not sure there were any. (Most of the talks about Islam were about moderate Islam, given by Muslims, often in a compare-and-contrast interfaith setting.)
no subject
Date: 2008-02-07 05:05 pm (UTC)